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Abstract: The 1930s transformed American capitalism. This article interrogates the 
political economy of two business magazines created at the start of the Great Depression. 
I argue that Business Week’s and Fortune’s signature approaches to reporting articulated 
an ideal conception of the manager. The early century conception saw the manager as 
engineer of operational efficiency. The new ideal viewed the manager as a political 
economist coordinating firms with their external environment, notably an interventionist 




In the middle years of the 1930s, American business seemed beset by mass distrust. In 
literature and in the visual and performing arts, business elites were charged with 
conspiracy against human dignity and collective purpose. New laws intruded on 
commercial privacy and mandated periodic accounting of firms’ operations, finances, and 
use of investor funds.1 Matching the public scrutiny of private enterprise, economists 
devised new theories of competition and governance premised on the discretion of 
monopolistic concerns and their executive class.2 Despite all of the damning attention, the 
authority of the professional manager emerged undiminished from the Great Depression. 
In this article, I examine how the social type of the manager was reimagined during the 
Depression and poised to become a crucial protagonist in the mid-century mixed 
economy.3 At the heart of this article is a study of how new idioms of business print 
idealized management. The magazines Business Week and Fortune directed their readers’ 
attention away from conceptions of the manager as engineer of operational efficiency and 
toward accounts of management expertly setting policy that integrated firms with 
industry, markets, and government.  
At the turn of the twentieth century, business was guided by an associative ideal that 
praised executives’ personal values of honesty and fortitude but placed no requirements 
on their knowledge or expertise. Executive elites coordinated industrial interests through 
gentlemanly agreements at clubs and at service and trade associations. Their claim of 
protecting industry from destructive competition seemed to marry private gain to civic 
virtue. When deliberate concert failed to stave off the stock market downturn of 1929, as 
it had done in 1907, President Hoover hosted conferences with business leaders to revive 
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their shared purpose. In his “one hundred days,” President Roosevelt subscribed to the 
same doctrine, and with the National Industrial Recovery Act he sought to fortify 
voluntary industrial associations with corporatist law. The codes of the National 
Recovery Administration set standards of production and price floors that relied on the 
wisdom of industry leaders and the machinery of the Chamber of Commerce and allied 
trade associations.4  
By 1935, with the Supreme Court’s repeal of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
coordination of business activity through corporate agreement seemed doomed. Business, 
big and small, had not complied with the codes sabotaging what many saw as an 
insidious intrusion of the state into private affairs. In the years that followed, 
emphatically from 1937, the New Deal changed course. The attorney general’s 
investigations of corporations obstructed the practices of price setting and market 
segmentation, and legislation prohibited banks from consultative and reorganizational 
activity that had achieved coordination through financial intermediation.5 World War II 
eased reconciliation between the federal government and the corporate giants, but it did 
so under terms that did not resurrect corporative or associational arrangements. The legal 
form for the public–private partnership during the Cold War was contracts for guns and 
butter, subject to periodical renewal and negotiation.6  
It was once customary to describe the Great Depression as an interregnum in the 
history of business, given the period’s apparent dullness in organizational innovation and 
change.7 This article endorses the view that the Great Depression engendered the 
conditions—technological and administrative—that sustained the extraordinary advance 
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of American corporations during World War II and its aftermath.8 Managerial functions, 
together with the circuits of information and knowledge that supported them, had to be 
reconfigured in the 1930s to match an age of intense regulatory change, fierce 
competition for volatile markets, and labor combativeness. Rather than excise the once 
civic goal of industrial coordination, the unraveling of associativism recast and fortified 
coordination as an administrative function of professional managers in private and public 
bureaucracies.9 Control of the firm’s external environment was an imperative for survival 
during the Depression, but it sought more than the defensive containment of threats.10 
Understanding of political economy, industry, state, and public was also, even primarily, 
a means to boldly chase opportunity. 
The kernel of the cultural authority of management at the turn of the century was 
operational design. The Efficiency Movement of Henry Taylor had offered the aspiring 
managerial profession the trappings of a science, but by the 1910s its prestige was 
exhausted. While the human relations of Elton Mayo and the Hawthorne studies renewed 
the authority of the manager as designer of a more harmonious workplace,11 a companion 
ideal is discernible that placed managers as interpreters of political economy. In addition 
to the diagrams of time and motion studies, managers’ tool kit included statistics, 
economics, and public opinion research.  
To examine changes in the representations, and aspirations, of American managers, 
one may contrast business school curricula, the literature coming out of learned societies, 
and professional associations or the internal communication of firms. Although I will 
briefly address that evidential record, I set my focus on tracing the careers of two 
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magazines conceived at the threshold of the Great Depression. Business Week published 
its first issue on September 7, 1929, seven weeks before Black Tuesday. Fortune started 
with a trial issue that was circulated to advertisers in the same month and announced to 
readers of Time on the week of the crash. It began publication in February 1930. The 
magazines chronicled business practices and, at the same time, reported and advocated 
for a new orientation of managerial values. While a third of financial and business 
publications were decimated by the Depression, Business Week and Fortune prospered. 
Fortune began with 30,000 subscribers and finished the decade with 130,000; Business 
Week was not far behind with 110,000.12 Fortune recovered its startup investment within 
three years and began making a modest profit. Business Week lost $1.5 million in its first 
five years, but its prospects improved rapidly after 1934–1935.13 They addressed a reader 
of a new kind: an outward-looking manager. The remarkable commercial success of these 
publications is of a piece with their intellectual program.  
The two magazines intently sought a new kind of business journalism. They 
abandoned the focus on stock markets and investor sentiment that had been the standard 
in the genre to devote themselves to executive decision. Both magazines were sold by 
subscription to corporate supervisory and executive staff. Business Week was marketed 
by salesmen visits to corporate offices.14 While older business titles were recruited to 
campaigns against the New Deal, Fortune and Business Week remained unaligned.15 The 
two magazines soberly surveyed business in numbers and stories, and photographs and 
graphs, and took advantage of the disclosures of finances, operations, and strategies of 
firms. In their reporting both linked profit and growth to the anticipation of change, but 
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understood this calling differently. Business Week promised to weekly scope news and 
data about industry. It covered mergers and deals, price battles and the summitry of trade 
associations, and surveyed consumer markets in thick numerical detail. Fortune monthly 
sought to describe the organizational range of American enterprise and to reveal how 
profit could be won by ingenuity and a service ethos to customers and associates. It 
profiled companies and gave each a balance sheet, a compelling mission statement, and a 
narrative. The imagined reader of these insights was a manager mindful of the diversity 
and excitement of American capitalism. 
I begin by arguing that Business Week and Fortune claimed for themselves a new 
genre distinct from industrial and financial print that courted a growing readership of 
professional managers.16 I then examine Business Week and Fortune by looking at each 
magazine’s most emblematic reporting device. The business indicator of Business Week 
and the corporation story of Fortune represented and tracked American business and 
anchored the reporting of each issue. I contend that the editorial visions of the magazines 
assigned managers the coordination of the firm with the state, clients, and competitors, 
and presented themselves as tools of business decision and planning.  
 
Magazines for Managers 
Business print in the 1930s bracketed industrial, professional, science, and technology 
publications. The first textbook in business journalism, published in 1945, claimed for the 
genre 1,600 titles with various overlaps in topic and generously estimated a joint 
readership of 25 million.17 At the start of the 1930s, the dominant publications in both 
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readership and prestige were financial papers at the service of capital markets and 
investors. The earliest publications of this kind date to the early decades of the American 
republic. The New York Prices Current and the Boston Prices Current and Marine 
Intelligencer, Commercial and Mercantile were the first in 1795. Some of these titles 
became working tools for merchants, bankers, and brokers.18 The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle was the most distinguished and best remembered. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, it was a trusted companion to Wall Street finance, with quotations of 
bonds and earning reports occupying the majority of its ninety weekly pages.19 The 
Chronicle was exclusively read by a specialist audience. In the interwar years, a new type 
of financial paper appeared that captivated the enthusiasm of middle-class investors.20 
The longest surviving specimens of that press are Forbes and Barron’s. From 1917 
Forbes held watch of the stock and bond markets. It claimed a popular following by 
printing inspirational literature and by offering laconic and boisterous opinions that 
adapted “yellow press” diction to financial affairs. Barron’s appeared in 1921, and 
throughout the interwar period was a three-column weekly broadsheet carrying the 
frontispiece motto: “For those who read for profit.” Its most distinctive features were 
“Financial Queries and Investment Suggestions,” a one-pager written by the editors, and 
“What of the Market?,” which appeared on the opening page and was written from the 
perspective of a Wall Street trader. The financial press that entered the Depression was 
written for the investor, at times incoherently addressing both amateurs and professionals. 
Fortune and Business Week originated with the coincidental ambition of inventing a 
new kind of magazine directed at executives. The title they sought to better was Nation’s 
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Business, an official publication of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The publication 
began in April 1914 as a dry sixteen-page monthly newsletter to its membership. Within 
a year, it gained an attractive color cover and type design, reduced its four-column format 
to spacious two columns, with photographs of places and faces. In 1929 it boasted more 
than three hundred thousand in circulation and consisted of 240 heavily advertised pages. 
Inspection of one issue of March 1929 reveals forty-five items of content, including the 
concluding installment of a long essay by President Hoover on “American 
Individualism,” along with “an anonymous confession” of “I’m a Failure at Fifty.” 
Nation’s Business was at the service of boosterism and associativism, ennobling the 
values and views of the executive elite. Business Week and Fortune agreed that they 
should be independent. They forbade ghostwriting, which was ubiquitous in periodical 
business print. All content was to be authored by the magazines’ staff. They opposed 
relaying the opinions of business leaders, however distinguished they might be, and in a 
rejection of business hagiography, they demythologized business success.  
The two magazines differed in some obvious ways. Business Week asserted technical 
competence and laborious comprehensiveness. Fortune celebrated luxury and power, 
taking pride in the verve and depth of its reporting. The publishers’ imprints explain these 
differences in self-presentation and in the repertoires used to represent business. 
Fortune’s Time, Inc. was an upstart venture with one fast growing title pitched to an 
affluent middle-class readership. Meanwhile. Business Week’s McGraw-Hill Publishing 
Company was the largest publisher of industrial papers in America. 
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McGraw-Hill’s company history bears a mimetic relationship with the institutional 
evolution of American capitalism. The company originated with the merger in 1917 of 
John A. Hill’s magazines in mechanical engineering and mining and James H. McGraw’s 
electrical engineering and transportation titles. In the company’s jargon, each of these 
titles was a “vertical” publication. The label comments on how the titles, for instance 
Coal Age, covered news of vertically integrated industry from supplier to consumer. 
McGraw-Hill in the 1920s bought competing trade publishers to consolidate the 
dominance of its catalog within each industry segment. In the course of this wave of 
mergers and acquisitions, the publishing executives began planning for a title that was not 
industry specific and could tap economies gained from reusing the operations set up for 
the various magazines. It was to be a “horizontal” magazine, “serving a function that cuts 
through all industry.” When McGraw-Hill purchased A. W. Shaw Company in 1928, it 
also bought a subscription list for its synthetic magazine and created not one but two 
horizontal titles, Business Week and Factory.  
Factory merged with another purchased title, Industrial Management, formerly 
published by the New York-based Engineering Magazine Co. Like its nearest competitor, 
a journal called Management and Administration, Factory and Industrial Management, it 
shone a light on best practices in production and office design, delivered through 
diagram-illustrated essays and reports of motion studies.21 Business Week was different. 
It was offered to the subscribers of Shaw’s Magazine of Business as a “liaison agent,” and 
drew from the knowledge base of twenty-two specialized journals. The new magazine 
was a departure from the format of the Magazine of Business and its predecessor, 
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System.22 It was designed in a portable format with a predictable divisional structure 
filled by numerous articles, each short in length but written with a care for detail. It 
followed the design of Time and was the first of its many imitators.23 
By contrast with the genesis of Business Week, the motivation for Fortune was more 
idiosyncratic and personal. Most accounts credit the conception of the magazine to Henry 
Luce’s desire to challenge journalistic conventions. Fortune was the company’s second 
title, six years after the creation of Time. Luce’s next project was to “accurately, vividly 
and concretely … describe Modern Business, … the greatest journalistic assignment in 
history.” The promotional material for Fortune, circulated to advertisers and subscribers, 
promised “to realize the dignity and the beauty, the smartness and excitement of modern 
industry.”24  
The two titles were distinct print objects. Business Week in its first half-year was 
impressive, with color work on its cover, heavy stock-coated paper, and abundant 
illustrations in line cuts and halftones. It was an object for the office. Fortune was an 
object for the executive lounge, with the likeness of a catalogue or a fashion magazine. 
Fortune was 14 by 11.25 inches, with poster art on its cover, and bulking hand-sewn at 
190 pages. In its first two years, it required the combined efforts of two printers, one for 
the text in letterpress and another for illustrations on thick uncoated paper that took 
several runs through the presses.25 Business Week was portable, to be clipped and pasted 
and handled. Fortune was too bulky and too expensive for most pockets. Its copies were 
exhibited and treasured. 
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While Business Week’s ambitions were set on the comprehensiveness of its 
journalistic assignment, Fortune was on a mission to document industrial life. Business 
Week was written by industry journalists and economists trained to address a readership 
of engineers and managers. In its first decade, Fortune was the collaborative effort of 
northeastern college graduates and aspiring and accomplished poets and novelists who 
partnered with industrial photographers and clerical researchers. The differences between 
publishers, mission, and composition of the newsrooms map onto the two magazines’ 
distinct vocations in business print. Business Week wanted to be scholarship for business. 
Fortune sought to offer business its literature.26 Business Week captured economic life by 
indexing. It created a statistical index to record the ebb and flow of economic activity, 
and it indexed the news of industry, finance, and commerce into ordered sections. 
Fortune conceived story-types to encapsulate the excitement and beauty of American 
business. 
The imagined reader of financial publications such as the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle was the banker or investor alert to the latest equity issuance and the 
movements of prices and ratings. The targeted reader of Business Week and Fortune was 
interested in the organization of industry and commerce.27 Even though the magazines 
differed in their approaches to reporting, they agreed that the American manager was 
watchful and knowledgeable of the scope of American enterprise, and that management 




Early advertisements for Business Week promised a magazine for an age of “spread and 
speed” in American business. The magazine took its slogan from the 1929 report of 
President Hoover’s Committee on Recent Economic Changes. This reference to 
government-sanctioned scholarship testifies to the joint commitment of press and state to 
educate and inform business. When it purchased the A. W. Shaw Company, McGraw-
Hill also acquired the publishing rights of Harvard Business Review, the dissertation and 
casebook series of Harvard Business School. Under the same imprint, McGraw-Hill sold 
business magazines, academic journals, textbooks, and manuals. The publishers signed 
up for the educational campaign. Shaw was an early backer of Harvard Business School 
and promoter of its Bureau of Business Research. He taught at the school from 1911 to 
1917, and started a course on Business Policy that was later to develop the famed “case 
method.”28 James H. McGraw lacked the prestige of Harvard employment, but 
throughout his long career he acted out the demeanor of a “schoolmaster,” which was his 
occupation prior to publishing.29 A core value in industrial publishing, as in business 
publishing, was to aid the continued education of professionals. 
McGraw had retired when Business Week began publication, but his repeated 
admonition to editors of “know your industry” was often repeated within the company. 
Business Week, because it covered all industries, required a different motto—to know 
your economy—and promised its readers the “mountain-top from which you could scan 
the condition of all business.”30 To deliver that promise, the magazine drew on data and 
research from congressional committees; from trade associations, such as the National 
Industrial Conference Board; and from statistical institutes, such as the National Bureau 
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of Economic Research (NBER). In addition to relaying the findings of others, the 
magazine took pride in pursuing its own studies, describing them as a “service” to its 
subscribers, and kept on its staff an economist (who was a former chief economist and 
later president of the National Industrial Conference Board) and a statistician.31 In spring 
and summer 1931, for example, the magazine serialized in twenty parts a yearlong 
research project on “The American Consumer Market.” It was a quantitative description 
of nearly a thousand items of “just about everything the American people buy” in the 
period from 1919 to 1930. It was presented to professionals “who need this information 
to guide their businesses.”32 Most of the magazine’s studies scanned the conditions of 
individual industries. In fall 1930 alone, Business Week surveyed steel, automobile, 
textiles, railroads, construction, machinery, and banking. It reviewed production statistics 
for each sector and asked whether rising or decreasing demand was expected and how 
competition between the major firms would play out. In the words of Business Week’s 
champion at McGraw-Hill, Malcolm Muir, the magazine helped “an industry … to 
recognize its interest in other industries, the impact of one on the other.”33 Business Week 
was educating its readers about the channels of commerce and the interdependence of 
American capitalism. 
The most iconic feature of Business Week’s reporting was an indicator of business 
activity. Beginning with the issue for May 7, 1930, Business Week’s cover swapped 
expensive photographic illustration for a minimalist design. The magazine’s title, 
followed by a colon, headed the drawing of a thermometer occupying the full height of 
the page and it was paired with an adjacent text box (Figure 1). The metric reappeared at 
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the end of the book together with an extended review of weekly data on finance, industry, 
and trade.34 In January 1934, the index’s discussion and the accompanying series were 
moved to the front of the magazine for a “business roundup” and primed the digest of the 
week’s news. Marked on the thermometer were the scores of the previous week and year, 
eventually also the scores of the previous month (from 1936) and previous semester 




Business Week’s “business indicator” was a feature of the magazine for more than 
three decades and the emblem of its commitment to data and social science. Examining 
the choices involved in the formulation and interpretation of the indicator reveals that 
Business Week endorsed an ideal of the manager knowledgeable of the conditions of the 
national economy. Three facets characterized the political economy outlook of the 
idealized reader. First, objective measurement was preferred over sentiment. Second, 
national industry was conceived as a delimited and coherent economic entity. Third, the 
economy was taken to be the subject of private and public administration and not as 
nature given and regulated by immutable laws. 
In its early presentations, the indicator was read as a barometer, and deviations from 
the norm were interpreted as foretelling good or bad commercial conditions.35 For the 
subscribers of Business Week, the implicit weather metaphor was familiar, as it had been 
carried over from its preceding title, the Magazine of Business. In its last half decade, the 
Magazine of Business printed maps of the United States and of the world with colored 
flags indicating regional expectations of growth. Underlying this weather map was a 
survey of business sentiment. Every month a ballot was sent to a subset of a mailing list 
of twenty thousand businesses. A 6-by-5-inch card queried if business activity was above 
or below average or normal, what was the expected volume increase, and what were the 
most and least favorable factors for business. The magazine pictured two readers leaning 
over the map with the posture of generals deciding on troop deployment. The readers 
were expected to chase the good weather by moving trade to regions with sunny 
prospects. 
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The Magazine of Business’ ballot held business leaders as privileged observers of 
market developments. Business Week continued to collect the sentiment of executives in 
a similar questionnaire: the Council on the Trend of Business. However, it downgraded 
the attention given to such findings. Instead, to track business, the magazine favored an 
index of physical volume of production and trade composed of eight “fundamental 
indicators.” It introduced the index as “our best judgment, fortified by the application of 
accepted scientific methods of treatment.”36 The remarkable feature of the index was not 
its statistical sophistication but its intention to place the quantification of economic 
activity on the table of managerial decision and planning.  
The indicator was objective but opaque. The formula of the index was disclosed only 
in 1938 after it underwent a major reformulation. To accept the plausibility of its 
component series, it is important to understand them as a sampling of various aspects of 
business activity. Indeed, no argument was made for the choice of each of the component 
series or for the insight gained by factoring them together. In its original recipe, the 
ingredients were “steel ingot production; ... building construction ... contracts awarded in 
37 states; butiminous coal production; electric power production; car loadings of non-
bulk freight; checks drawn and cashed in banks in 140 cities outside New York; and 
outstanding commercial loans of reporting Federal Reserve member banks.”37 To readers 
of the 1930s, the odd mix credibly resembled the formulas of pioneer forecaster Roger 
Babson and of Carl Snyder’s production index published by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.38  
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Business Week interpreted the movements of its index with discussions of the 
interplay between speculation, production, and credit, much like the forecasting routines 
of the Harvard Economic Service, which began as a research unit within Harvard 
University’s Department of Economics. It was allied with John Maynard Keynes in the 
international promotion of barometers. The Economic Service was closed under pressure 
from Harvard alumni and administration seeking to save face after its failure to predict 
the Depression. Its former members, notably Warren Persons, carried on offering their 
services to firms and publications, including begetting one of Business Week’s closest 
competitors. Barron’s Index of Production and Trade appeared on October 29, 1934, in a 
regular section near the middle of the magazine, entitled “How’s Business?” and was 
signed by Persons. Business Week was agnostic about the theory of business cycles. It 
drew equally from the pseudoscientific methods of Babson and the better credentialed but 
ill-fated approach of the Harvard Economic Service.39 
Incoherence in the magazine’s barometric allegiances was unproblematic because the 
indicator soon began to serve a different purpose that matched its symbolic presentation. 
Business Week went from calling its index a “barometer” and using it as a forecasting 
tool to deploying it as a thermometer and an evaluative device. The initial intention in 
early 1930 was that the index would announce the economic recovery. The magazine’s 
reading of the barometer throughout 1930 was “cloudy” and “clearing,” but instead of a 
return to pre-Depression levels, the index continued its descent. In July 1930 the 
magazine foresaw that the upturn would be evident by August, and business would reach 
its normal level by October. In the following three weeks, the index fell ten points. By 
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January 1931 the magazine’s belief in the self-correcting powers of business was 
shattered. After half a year of waiting for the sun to break through, an editorial explained 
that “recovery will not come by ‘natural’ forces, because there are none in business 
except the weather; everything that caused and everything that will cure this depression is 
artificial.”40 If the economy was not self-regulating (and thus nothing like the weather) 
then the movements of the index could not be read as signals of what was to come.  
The alternative conception was that the economy was an administered entity, and this 
insight explains why the magazine came to rely on the indicator to evaluate policy. 
Business Week’s depressing index was a reminder of the need to engineer recovery, and it 
provided a measure of the effectiveness of the actions of government, courts, and 
industrial and trade groups. The indicator also promised to calibrate managerial planning 
and decision making. As a measurement of the pace of business activity, it could be used 
to contain excesses in optimism or pessimism and thus coordinate the plans of managers. 
The magazine’s twelfth “special report to executives” in September 1938 was devoted to 
asserting the value of the index for managers. Mentioning correspondence from its 
readers, the magazine explained that the index was used to “compar[e] their sales … with 
general business activity in order to determine whether salesmen were on their toes,” and 
that the index was often plotted in annual reports to stockholders to show “how the 
company was keeping up with the general business parade.” It concluded that “a business 
index is nothing more or less than a statistical tool, it is to the economist and the business 
man what a spirit level is to a carpenter.”41 The movements of the index promised 
managers a benchmark to evaluate the performance of their companies and divisions. 
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As one influential management treatise of the period instructed, the manager must 
ensure that his firm “adjust itself to the general economic conditions” and “develop its 
strategy so that this adjustment will result in bettering its own condition.”42 Belief in the 
use of statistics as a means to stabilize business was an idea rooted in the 1920s, thanks in 
large part to the initiative of Herbert Hoover’s Department of Commerce.43 By the 1930s, 
that conviction was unchallenged and broadcast in the writings of academics and trade 
associations.44 In commercial print, Business Week was not alone. As I previously noted, 
Barron’s sported its own index of business activity, but trade publications also 
configured indexes for their specific industries. For instance, Steel, a weekly magazine 
published by Penton Publishing Company, in Cleveland, held the middle of the book for 
two pages of indexes and charts on the “business trend,” and it calculated its own index 
of steel production.  
The Business Week indicator was not a precise instrument. The scores were revised 
each week as a result of corrections to the underlying data series and the moving average 
smoothing. As years went by, the magazine felt more assured of the accurateness and 
plausibility of its device and wrote proudly of the careful study that lay behind it. Despite 
originating from compromise in available data, the magazine believed it was offering its 
readers the pulse of the American economy. At such confused and uncertain times as the 
Depression years, Business Week made the economy visible, every week, on its cover. It 
was in the 1930s that efforts intensified to create some agreed register of national 
economic activity. That effort was led by the National Bureau of Economic Research, the 
organization that provided the infrastructure for many of Hoover’s studies of the 
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American economy, and it offered Business Week its early slogan of “spread and 
speed.”45 Postwar, and with the force of international conventions, a system of national 
income accounts was codified, with the annual gross domestic product as its summary 
number. Business Week’s indicator, a weekly register, predated these developments. The 
belief in a unified sphere of economic activity thus preceded the acceptance of modern 
macroeconomics and of the managed economy.46 Familiarity of use with business 
indicators predisposed businessmen to accept GDP as a measure of national worth and 
prosperity.47 
The indicator invited readers of the magazine to be thoughtful and watchful of 
economic trends, and thus to imagine the manager as literate in political economy. 
Business schools reengaged with social science during the Depression, notably doubling 
their teaching in economics and statistics.48 The outward-looking manager contrasted 
with the Efficiency Movement’s engineer who broke down production and distribution 
into tasks and studied their articulation and timing. From a preoccupation with the pace 
of production, the managers imagined by Business Week looked to the pace of American 
business in its totality. 
 
Profiling 
Business Week borrowed from social science and private consultancy, while Fortune 
dismissed both. Time Inc. did not welcome statisticians or economists, and Luce once 
lamented that “the intellectual is tone deaf to business. What matter? He has read 
economics” and he “is far better read in economic theory than the businessmen he 
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meets.” Few among the senior staff of Fortune had read economics, and Luce’s quip that 
“it was easier to turn poets into business journalists than to turn bookkeepers into writers” 
became a slogan for Fortune’s daring naïveté. At another occasion, Luce restated the case 
that the writer must be an economist, and that “his approach to economics is through the 
emotional world of the imagination rather than through the cynical market place.”49 
Fortune was designed to create what I term literature for business. It addressed political 
economy through narrative and illustration. 
Business Week's articles were written as news, factual and unadorned. Fortune’s 
script had structure, with a provocative beginning, a substantive middle, and a clever 
punch line as a resolution. The lead was crucial not because it contained the gist but 
because, given that the subjects of the writing were not current and the articles were long, 
the reader would have to be gripped by story. By default, the hook was size. Photography 
and strong adjectives invited its readers to marvel at the scale of industry.50 
It has been insufficiently noted that Fortune’s inaugural subjects, mostly set by Luce, 
had the magazine responding to the legacy of the early century muckrakers. Fortune’s 
opening article was about Chicago’s Swift & Company. The meatpacking industry had 
been the subject of Upton Sinclair’s invective in The Jungle, and of the work of Edward 
Russell at Everybody’s Magazine.51 Fortune visited Swift & Co. to celebrate those 
features that the critics had described with revulsion, namely its efficiency and size. 
Parker Lloyd-Smith, the magazine’s founding managing editor, whimsically witnessed 
how “by countless individual acts of destruction [Swift & Co.] paradoxically increases 
the value of products which are the countless individual acts of creation.” The article 
	 22	
proceeded to sum the bulk of meat markets and the net profits of the grocer trade and all 
else that could be counted. The article was an example of Fortune’s self-advertised 
innovation in business journalism: the corporation story.  
That Fortune was counter-muckraking explains the focus on the corporation, but it 
does not account for the finer features of its signature story type. Corporation stories 
always interrogated the origins of the profiled firm, identified the practices and products 
that made it distinctive, and treated the corporation as a vital and evolving subject. The 
personification of corporations, such as “the corporation that makes a flame hotter than 
hell,” “the corporation that believes in inflation,” or “the corporation that sweetens the 
world” associated the magazine with the idiom of public relations. Corporate public 
relations, pioneered in the early 1920s, identified corporations through brands, slogans, 
and service ethos.52 Fortune’s stories established new markers of identity in production 
methods, marketing, and organizational structures. Fortune and public relations 
overlapped not only thematically but also in personnel, most conspicuously in the 
magazine’s art department. Margaret Bourke-White arrived at the magazine after earning 
some celebrity with Story of Steel, a spectacular portrayal of a foundry. The book owed a 
debt to John Hill, a pioneer of corporate public relations, who convinced Otis Steel to 
give Bourke-White access to the mills and to ensure the collaboration of the staff.53 
Designers of catalogues and of corporate stationery supplied most of the cover art of 
Fortune (but also communist artist Diego Rivera). Fortune’s stories and illustrations were 
preoccupied with the public appreciation of corporate capitalism.  
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Like Business Week, Fortune’s innovations were familiar to the magazine’s target 
readership, whom the commercial department of Time, Inc. identified to advertisers as 
“businessmen of “managerial capacity and up”—live-wire executives.”54 The editorial 
department was aware of the promotional value of Fortune’s content and was anxious 
about its independence. It was usual for companies to order dozens, and occasionally 
hundreds, of copies of the issue in which they were profiled, and gift these to associates 
and upper management. It was also usual for companies to advertise in the issue in which 
they were profiled. In December 1935, Fortune reported on Republic Steel as “the story 
of the struggle … of a supremely able management against supremely great odds.” It 
introduced the company’s president, George Girdler, as ruler, risk taker, and ruthless. 
Four pages after was a full color advert for the firm, which seemed to miss the irony of 
the feature, penned by Dwight MacDonald. Despite the pull of advertising and sales, 
there were few controversies over editorial slanting. On one rare occasion, Fortune’s 
managing editor was welcomed from his vacation by a protest of a writer accusing the 
editor in charge of hyping the glamour of the subject, the Del Monte Resort in California, 
by hushing evidence of the weak finances of the firm. After a flurry of memos, the 
publicity department was cleared of any perverse influence.55  
None of the celebrated writers of Fortune, such as Archibald MacLeish and James 
Agee, wrote corporation stories. The magazine’s most acclaimed genre was entrusted to 
lesser scribes, including Charles Wertenbaker and Frank Jessup, and the journeymen 
reporters. The compelling character of the corporation story was not found in its lyrical 
experimentation but in what one staff member called “practical industrial economics.” 
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The purpose was to reveal the secrets of corporations by examination of their “most 
salient problems,” while ensuring that “the readers sees it in relation to a whole.”56 The 
chosen companies were typically industrial giants, and starting around 1933 each issue 
included two corporation stories: one a leader of industry and the other a smaller concern 
in consumer or retail markets. The features invariably described each firm’s share of the 
market and their model methods of production and distribution before purporting to 
reveal the secret of their profitability. The depth of reporting was the achievement of an 
unsung group of women researchers, who began working on stories a month ahead of the 
writers. Thanks to increased publicity of company finances, they would assemble 
shareholder reports, financial statements, and speeches by officials, and then construct 
question sheets querying missing information or conflicting accounts. They would 
interview accountants and executives, and if a company cooperated they visited its 
offices to audit its records. When the companies did not collaborate, they guessed or 
deduced rough figures and shared early drafts to lure disclosure of amending details. 
Fortune’s second managing editor, Ralph Ingersoll, realizing the roles played by the 
clerical staff and human calculators, recruited college-trained women knowledgeable 
with economics and statistics.57 The result was a more judicious collection of information 
and more probing stories, at one point prompting Luce’s grumble, and implicit praise, 
that the research materials were better than the finished product.58 
Fortune’s corporation stories read as studies of good decision making in a harsh 
economic environment. In an unpublished autobiography, Ingersoll described the 
corporation story as “told in terms of people.” The story would ask: Who had the idea for 
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the business? Also, “What had he done about it? And how had he pulled it off, and with 
whose help and by what stratagems? It was a way of making money; how—and how 
much?” Who had the power, and how was it exercised? Finally, “always the whole was 
to be set in the context of the larger whole that was the industry of which it was a part and 
the national—even the world—economy.”59 For instance, when the magazine visited 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass, it asked: How had the company remained unharmed by the 
speculative follies of the late 1920s, expanded its earnings with no debt, and regularly 
distributed dividends? Its answer: the company found its strength in diversified client and 
product bases. In November 1932 Fortune countered general pessimism by sketching the 
profiles of fifteen corporations and how they had won markets and profitability. The 
attention Fortune gave to markets was attuned to changes in corporate practices. The 
focus on price competition and integration of production in the 1920s and 1930s shifted 
to marketing and sales as instruments of corporate control. Fortune held watch of 
institutional innovation in American capitalism.60 
Not all of Fortune’s reporting was in praise of the resourcefulness and creativity of 
American enterprise in the face of adversity. The two most notorious instances of 
business critique were the March 1934 “Arms and Men” article and the spring 1936 
series on U.S. Steel.61 The latter appeared in four parts, and it exposed the overreach of 
U.S. Steel and its assault on competitors and clients. The main focus was set on labor 
relations, charging the firm with neglect in caring for its employees.62 Throughout the 
decade, labor relations were a constant concern for the magazine. A story about Douglas 
Aircraft in 1935 was “a great saga of engineering” and “a fine statistical warning to 
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stockholders in aviation manufacturing companies,” but the editor in charge insisted that 
the writer also describe Douglas’s personnel, types of labor, and how much of it was 
unionized, because a description of the labor situation is “interesting and important in 
these times to any company.”63 The magazine confidently affirmed the dignity of 
American labor. In August 1931, Archibald MacLeish wrote that the “American 
Workingman” was the envy of civilized nations, the most productive, and best paid. The 
American worker was “a purchaser, a partner, and the key to production,” and unlikely to 
rebel since he had “ambition for a market and desire for willing cooperation.” In 1935–
1936, Fortune printed a series of working-family profiles entitled “Lives and 
Circumstances,” all with similar conclusions with regard to the motives of workers and 
their role in maintaining and creating markets.64 Fortune did not carry editorials, a rule 
broken only briefly by an ill-advised series on “Business and Government” in 1938,65 but 
in articles revisiting past economic crises and in invited bylined essays, the magazine 
came to endorse an underconsumptionist account of the Depression.66 
Fortune’s unlikely progressivism has seized the attention of its historians, but by 
contrast its most salient contents have been neglected.67 The “corporation story” was 
Fortune’s indicator, a privileged device to track business that survived past the 
Depression and World War II. Other story prototypes broke down on their test run. Luce 
experimented with the “city story,” and in the first year of publication assigned to himself 
articles on South Bend, Indiana, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.68 Luce profiled Pittsburgh 
as a city of technology and learning. He drew attention to the research facilities of 
Westinghouse and the philanthropy of Andrew W. Mellon. The personality of Mellon, 
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whose “most apparent characteristic is gentleness,” was for Luce dictating the character 
of Pittsburgh as a “gentle city.” That a company would take the personality of its 
president was plausible, and perhaps appropriate, but that a city would fall under a similar 
spell was disturbing. A story similar in structure about South Bend opened with a 
counting of how many babies were born a year and closed with two lovers consummating 
their passion in a Studebaker overlooking peppermint fields. Unlike the corporation 
profiles, the city stories offered no inspiring insights to the manager and read as banal and 
sentimental.69 
Fortune, as a monthly with literary ambitions, was not a publication to report on 
developing news. Given its concern with public relations, so manifest in its corporate 
profiles, it is telling that the one component of the magazine that chased current events 
was the Fortune Survey. The Survey was run by Elmo Roper from 1935 to 1940; it was 
first quarterly, and then monthly, and it monitored the public mood regarding politics, 
companies, and products.70 The magazine was concerned with business policy in its 
institutional dimension. Once it profiled a company, it would not return to it for years, 
and often did not report on more than one firm per industry. Like Business Week, it 
sought scope and covered the breadth of American business, but its distinctive 
contribution was the depth with which it probed firm organization. The “corporation 
stories” studied the architecture of private bureaucracy and seemed to offer blueprints for 
profitability. This insight was not the accomplishment of the star cast of writers and their 
prose but an outcome of increased publicity of company operations exploited by the 
magazine’s diligent researchers.  
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Fortune was not a tool for day-to-day managerial operation. The magazine imagined 
a manager seeking control of the external environment by scripting the service ethos and 
identity of his firm and by stipulating codes of practice with regard to associates and 
clients. Fortune’s outlook was institutional while Business Week’s was statistical. 
Nevertheless, Fortune shared with Business Week the ideal of an outward-looking 
manager who understood the corporation as embedded in an economy and polity. 
 
The Outlook 
Business Week and Fortune courted the attention and loyalty of an elite readership. The 
magazines slighted humor and levity. Business Week’s early issues included full-page 
cartoons, but these disappeared within a couple of months of publication, never to return. 
Fortune was regularly drawn to unusual topics, such as an article on the “industry” of 
Spanish bullfighting, penned by Ernest Hemingway, but even the unusual articles were 
padded with accounting detail and bore family resemblance with a business school case 
study. Both magazines were sober, independent, and claimed to be useful, the latter claim 
often asserted in readers’ correspondence. The press was traditionally sought after for 
commercial and financial information and as a broker of trust in the markets.71 The 
advisory function played by periodicals was conventionally financial: seeking and 
speculating on opportunities for investment. Business Week and Fortune wanted to be 
useful for administration.  
To aid their intended reader, the magazines repurposed established idioms and 
devices. Business Week’s indicator was once the barometer of the forecasters of the 1910s 
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and 1920s. Fortune’s corporation story was indebted to the exposé of the muckrakers of 
the 1900s and 1910s. These devices yielded insights into the political economy thanks to 
the interaction among increased availability of business information, new conceptions of 
the economy, and new visions of managerial control. The component data of the Business 
Week indicator and the company and industry information that was the foundation for 
Fortune’s corporate profiles were supplied by the state.72 New Deal incorporation and 
security exchange laws mandated regular disclosure of the finances of publicly traded 
companies, creating a historical record in the public domain. The magazines mined the 
value from the expanding economic publicity. The value they sought was to understand 
general economic conditions, and this preoccupation was an outcome of the traumas of 
the Great Depression. The belief that the Depression occurred naturally and self-
remediably was undermined by the persistence of the downturn and by the plight of mass 
unemployment and indigence.  
The magazines’ devices were the icons of their self-proclaimed innovations in 
business reporting. The devices anchored the contents of each issue with a promise to 
reveal essential but elusive features of business: in one case its erratic intensity, in the 
other its inner structures. From that standpoint, the magazines surveyed the 
interdependence of American enterprise and the strategies to accommodate the 
interventionist government, popular distrust of business, and the rise of industrial 
unionism. 
The magazines recorded a new managerial ideal that was in the making since the mid-
1920s, when statistical control and public relations were offered as promises to avert the 
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volatility of markets and of public sentiment, but that came into full force only in the 
middle years of the Great Depression. The magazines imagined the manager as unbound 
by industry or employer, with the expertise and experience to set a felicitous course in 
this inhospitable political economy. This conception agreed with changes in business 
education. Starting in 1933, under the leadership of Joseph Willits, the Wharton School 
made social science a crucial component of the curriculum, and its manifesto of “The 
Future of Business Education” urged the “developing [of] an understanding of the 
economic and social structure of the world.” Wharton also employed Simon Kuznets, 
who led the construction of the first national income accounts. Similarly, practitioners 
and gurus, such as James D. Mooney, called on managers to be concerned with the 
“sphere of policy, with the general problem of fitting the particular industrial effort to its 
economic, political, and social environment.”73 Magazines, together with business 
theorists and teachers of business, encouraged managers to think of themselves as actors 
within an administered economy. 
While expecting sophistication and literacy from its readers, Business Week and 
Fortune did not sing the managers’ cognitive powers and ethical integrity or assume them 
to be all-powerful. Such theses are more likely found in Adolph Berle and Gardiner 
Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property than in Fortune. The magazine 
decried the belief in the unbound discretion of corporate managers, and even blamed the 
manager for vanity, “because he has built himself up (or let his publicity department 
build him up) as a superior being,” in truth, the manager was not a master of 
circumstances but its victim or beneficiary.74 The managerial ideal of the Depression was 
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not triumphant; instead, it dramatized the uncertainty in the economic and political 
context of firms that were mindful of the dangers of contagion across industries and 
markets. It ennobled the efforts of the manager by the weight of his responsibility. The 
manager was the expert who could adapt and perhaps even exploit the harsh environment, 
knowing how to set the pace of business to the pace of the economy and to trace and 
exploit the scope of American industry. 
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“Keeping the Corporate Image”; Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul. For 
hierarchical corporate communications, see Yates, Control through Communication. 
53 Miller, Voice of Business; Goldberg, Margaret Bourke-White. Fortune would report 
sector by sector and profile one or two main players of each industry. Internal memos of 
the magazine take stock of which industries to profile next, and how often to return to the 
hot and controversial sectors of steel, aviation, or oil. It always profiled an industry’s 
leader. Several items, folder “Fortune, Articles, Proposed articles, 1937–40,” Box 53, 
Davenport Papers. 
54 Document entitled “William A. Lydgate,” the watermark identifies it as “copy of 
Scribner’s magazine” to which handwritten is added “uncorrected,” undated, 17, Box 53, 
Davenport Papers. 
55 “Republic Steel,” Fortune, December 1935, 76–84, 142–152. Letter from Russell 
Davenport to Eric Hodgins, W. H. Carey, Mr. Gratz, December 1, 1939, folder “Fortune, 
Articles, Del Monte,” Box 52, Davenport Papers. Davenport’s letter was followed by a 
response by the business director and by the worried writer. 
56 “Respectus,” dated May 10 and 11, 1937, 17, Box 53, and letter from Rhoda Booth to 
“Mitch” (i.e., Russell Davenport), undated, c.1938, Box 52, Davenport Papers.  
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57 Fortune’s writing staff in the mid-1930s included Archibald MacLeish, Russell 
Davenport, Charles Weterbaker, Eric Hodgins, Wilber Hobson, James Agee, Green 
Peyton, Ed Kennedy, Jack Jessup, John Chamberlain, Charles Murphy, and Arthur Furth. 
Hoopes, Ralph Ingersoll; Hodgins, Trolley to the Moon. 
58 The women researchers’ knowledge and studiousness is well recorded in the story 
memos preserved in the personal papers of Russell Davenport. Particularly impressive are 
the memos written by Dorothy Beal; for instance, her informed exposition of nascent 
income accounts. See folder “Fortune, Articles, National Income, 1939,” Box 52. On 
Luce’s memo, see Hodgins, Trolley to the Moon, 404. 
59 “High Time, ms 1970,” Folder 3, Box 15, Ralph Ingersoll Papers, Howard Gotlieb 
Archival Research Center. 
60 “US Corporate Management,” Fortune, 1933, 47–49, 51, 102. Fligstein, 
Transformation of Corporate Control.  
61 Authored by Eric Hodgins, “Arms and Men” was written from European sources, and 
had the benefit of a glimpse at the proofs of Merchants of Death (1934), by H. C. 
Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen. Hodgins, Trolley to the Moon. 
62 The series was the trigger for MacDonald’s departure from Fortune. He had drafted a 
final article on Myron Taylor, head of U.S. Steel, holding him responsible for the failings 
uncovered in the previous articles. However, the article was taken away from him and 
was written instead by Robert Cantwell. In MacDonald’s account, the article was 
abbreviated, and “an objective (hence unflattering) biography of Mr. Taylor was excised 
completely and replaced by a full-throated burst of lyrical eulogy which the editor in 
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charge took care to write himself.” The official history of Time, Inc., notes that the article 
had to be redone because it was too close to an editorial. 
63 Memo from Allen Grover to “Mitch” (i.e., Russell Davenport), March 12, 1935, Box 
52, Davenport Papers. 
64 “American Working Man,” Fortune, August 1931, 54–69. 
65 The editorials, written by Russell Davenport, were sharply critical of Roosevelt. 
Fortune’s attitude toward the New Deal was mostly inconsistent as a result of divided 
loyalties in its newsroom. New Deal economists Isador Lubin, Leon Henderson, Louis 
Bean, Adolph Berle, and others were sources for stories and interpretation. Their 
collaborations and contributions were never acknowledged in print. “Report on 
Spadework in Washington,” MacLeish to Hodgins, Furth, Wood, Harris, and Jessup, May 
19, 1936, folder “Fortune,” Box 8, Archibald MacLeish Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress.  
66 The underconsumptionist thesis was spelled out in the magazine’s pages only in 1933 
in a signed article from an English economist. The author was Sir Arthur Salter, a former 
official at the League of Nations. John Maynard Keynes’s writings were found in the 
New Republic. Salter, in April 1933, noted that the trouble was in “the exhaustion of 
effective demand, that is, of purchasing power.” Arthur Salter, “Future for Capitalism,” 
Fortune, April 1933, 60–63. See also “Depression of 93–97,” Fortune, 1931, 78–89, 102, 
104, 106, 111–112, 115; “No One Has Starved...,” Fortune, September 1932, 18–29, 80.  
67 Fortune has received far greater attention in the literature than Business Week. The 
only account on the history of Business Week is found in McGraw-Hill’s official history. 
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Burlingame, Endless Frontiers. Along with several company histories of Time–Life and 
biographies of Henry Luce, two book-length studies specifically on Fortune have 
appeared in the past decade, and the magazine is a favorite assignment for graduate 
dissertations. That Fortune has attracted such fascination is an unlikely cultural artifact. 
Augspurger, in Economy of Abundant Beauty, shows that during the Depression, Fortune 
imagined America as a land of prosperity and promise. Vanderlan, in Intellectuals 
Incorporated, examines the clash between Fortune’s formidable cast of writers and the 
demands set by the publication’s cheerleading mission and Henry Luce’s conservatism. 
Few authors have examined Fortune as a business publication. The exception is Reilly, in 
“Corporate Stories,” who examines the overlap between the corporation stories and 
advertising script. As do I, Reilly highlights Fortune’s celebration of institutional 
mastery. 
68 Pittsburgh was one of Lincoln Steffen’s Shamed Cities. It was also the subject of a 
major survey by the Russell Sage Foundation in 1908–1909. The foundation argued for 
collective bargaining and labor legislation to stop the “labor policy of unrestricted 
capital.” Steffens, Shame of the Cities; Rutherford, “Field, Undercover, and Participant 
Observers.” 
69 “Pittsburgh,” Fortune, 1930, 48–54, 135–136, 138, 140, 146. The magazine included 
an addendum on the same issue, defensively explaining why it focused on the Mellon 
family and ignored the ignobility of slum life in neighborhoods like Herron Hill. 
“Afterthoughts on Pittsburgh,” Fortune, 1930, 148; “The Unseen Half of South Bend,” 
Fortune, 1930, 52–57, 102, 104, 106, 108, 111. 
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70 Unlike the contemporary efforts of the National Association of Manufacturers or 
DuPont’s American Liberty League, the writers and editors of Fortune did not look to the 
surveys as a progress report of a campaign for public opinion. Their purpose was to 
educate its readers on the public’s views and explain them. Bird, Better Living; Tedlow, 
“Keeping the Corporate Image.” 
71 Ratings pioneered by Henry Varnum Poor began in periodicals before they were 
packaged in Manuals and as expensive subscription services. Poor, as journalist, 
historian, and broker of railroads, campaigned for publicity of company records and 
helped marry Wall Street investment banking with the railroad boom by issuance of 
credible credit ratings. Poor, History of the Railroads; Poor, Poor’s Manual of Railroads. 
On Poor, see Chandler, Henry Varnum Poor.  
72 Didier, En Quoi Consiste l’Amérique?; Stapleford, Cost of Living in America. 
73 Sass, Pragmatic Imagination, 201–205; Mooney and Reiley, Principles of 
Organization, 187.  
74 “US Corporate Management,” Fortune, June 1933, 47–49, 51, 102. 
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